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Foreword
Although development and promotion of inclusive agricultural value chains 
are widely recognised as key strategies for achieving economic growth and 
ensuring social cohesion in most African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions, 
inclusiveness is often not documented or analysed.
Inclusive value chains generally do not arise naturally; they are the result of 
lengthy discussions, consultations and negotiations between the actors of the 
chain as they try to find a balance between sometimes divergent interests. 
Trust is a critical element in that process and often determines the success or 
failure of such collective initiatives.
Since 2010, CTA has been supporting the development of sustainable, inclusive 
and profitable value chains in ACP countries using a three-step approach: 
building the evidence, strengthening the capacities of value-chain actors and 
facilitating multistakeholder dialogue. Documenting success stories and in 
particular the factors influencing inclusiveness is extremely important if we are 
to really understand the dynamics of such value chains and more importantly 
to be able to scale them up.
The six cases presented in this report (jatropha in Burkina Faso and Mali; 
oilseeds in Uganda; litchi in Madagascar; cashew in Benin; milk products in 
Senegal; and bananas, pigs and aquaculture in Uganda) are concrete examples 
of how smallholders can effectively participate in value chains and identify 
the main criteria for success in establishing inclusiveness. These are analysed 
to provide a list of key issues that appear to be preconditions for ensuring 
long-term inclusiveness.
We would like to thank again the non-governmental and research organisations 
that responded to our initial call for papers and for the richness of their 
analysis. We strongly believe that such lessons need to be systematically 
learned and shared and we invite all our partners and readers to help us in 
disseminating the findings as widely as possible. There is simply no time to 
reinvent the wheel.
Michael Hailu
Director
CTA
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1Executive Summary
This paper reports on six case studies commissioned by CTA to examine factors 
contributing to the success of inclusive value chains in ACP countries. All six 
studies are from Africa. They cover: (1) jatropha chains in Burkina Faso and 
Mali; (2) oilseeds in Uganda; (3) litchi in Madagascar; (4) cashew in Benin; (5) 
milk products in Senegal; and (6) bananas, pigs and aquaculture in Uganda.
There is a range of definitions of inclusive value chains but such chains are 
generally considered to be those that seek to obtain supply from poorer 
farmers, thereby maximising farmers’ access to market opportunities. Recent 
developments in production and marketing systems do not automatically 
benefit small-scale farmers and conscious efforts need to be made to achieve 
positive results for them. Even so, not all farmers can be included, for reasons 
such as their location, farm size and natural resources, capacity to meet 
increasingly strict product standards, and the farmers’ aversion to risk.
According to FAO, features likely to be found in an inclusive value chain 
include: suitability for households with few assets; reliable and profitable 
trading practices; diversified market opportunities; a strong element of 
capacity building; and full and transparent consultation. Although “inclusion” 
tends to emphasise the position of farmers within a chain, the strength of the 
value chain approach is that it moves development efforts away from being 
farmer-centred to considering the entire chain from producer to consumer. 
Some of the case studies well illustrate the value of this approach, such as 
litchi in Madagascar where efforts to develop export sales had a positive 
benefit for all in the chain.
A major factor in the success of inclusive chain development is the extent to 
which the buyers provide “embedded” services, such as input supply and 
technical advice, for which the farmers only pay indirectly through lower final 
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prices for their products. Not only does this practice overcome the financial 
constraints of farmers but it also gives them access to inputs and support that 
might otherwise be unavailable. Even where such support is not fully embedded 
and farmers are required to meet some costs directly, the provision of improved 
seeds and other inputs specifically tailored to the needs of a particular product 
buyer can be very beneficial. 
Efforts to establish inclusive value chains may fail if the buyers make little 
effort to understand both the agricultural practices and skills of the farmers 
and their socio-cultural environment. For example, yield projections should be 
based on the local farm situation and not on yields achieved on commercial 
farms or on research stations. The capacity and willingness of farmers to 
follow recommended practices should be fully assessed. The implications of 
new farming practices on household and employed labour, and on gender 
relations, must be fully reviewed.
Trust between farmers and buyers is essential if inclusive chains are to be 
successful. Developing such trust can be complex and time-consuming and the 
role of outsiders, such as NGOs, in supporting this can be beneficial. Regular 
meetings between buyers and farmers are important, as are multi-stakeholder 
approaches that bring together all involved in a chain, including government 
officers and local politicians. A major cause of discord is slow payment and 
companies should ensure that they pay on delivery or as soon as possible 
thereafter. Delayed payment jeopardised the oilseeds chain in Uganda. 
Risk minimisation is a major factor in farmers’ production and marketing 
decisions. Farming always involves risks and inclusive value chains should be 
set up in such a way that the risk is certainly not increased and, preferably, is 
reduced. Risk reduction should result from farmers having access to reliable 
markets, price guarantees, and advice that can help them address climate and 
other production risks. Creating a dependence on just one crop should be 
avoided and there are good recent examples of where companies have 
encouraged their farmers to diversify. 
Projects and businesses seeking to promote inclusive value chains do, 
therefore, need to carry out a realistic assessment of the capacity of small-
scale farmers to take on production activities. Because a particular investment 
by a farmer seems like a good idea to the manager of a contracting company, 
or to an NGO staff member, it does not mean that the investment will be seen 
in the same light by poor farmers, particularly if it appears to them that this 
will increase their risk.
3While households may benefit from efforts to promote inclusion, this does not 
mean that benefits will necessarily be shared equally. Depending on the 
particular culture of an area, women may see few rewards and may actually 
lose out. They sometimes face an increased workload, while financial benefits 
go only to the men. Training courses and meetings are often held only for 
men, even when the women do the bulk of the work. The potential negative 
impact of involvement in value chains on household food production is of 
particular concern. This can result from allocating land previously used for 
food gardens to cash crop production or from the increased workload faced 
by women.
Companies rarely want to deal directly with thousands of individual small-
scale farmers. Farmer organisations and cooperatives can play an important 
role, either as agents of a company or as the prime movers of an inclusive 
value chain. The use of full-time business management appears to be essential 
for farmer organisations seeking to become involved directly in value chains 
as there are many risks associated with poor management skills.
NGOs working to support inclusive value chain development have tried various 
approaches. One model is to work only with established organisations and not 
try to set up new ones. Bodies set up solely to bring about inclusion often 
have a short life span.  On the other hand, where no suitable organisations 
exist an inclusive value chain may require some consolidation of farmers into 
groups in order to promote communication, provide training and facilitate 
logistics to deliver inputs and collect the products. 
The case studies show that inclusion of small-scale farmers often requires a 
“trial and error” approach by both companies and NGOs, in order to arrive at 
the most suitable model for a particular environment. Changes in approach are 
fairly common as companies struggle to identify the best method of working 
with farmers, and NGOs discover how best to link the buyers and farmers.
The research also suggested that the tendency in development work to ignore 
the traditional trading sector may be misguided. While not suitable for the 
handling of products requiring export quality and traceability, traditional 
marketing intermediaries do have a capacity to provide transport from remote 
areas, to buy small quantities per farmer and to pay in cash.  Farmers are 
often inclined to sell to them despite agreements with other buyers. However, 
in contrast to the frequent support provided by donors and NGOs to farmer 
organisations, it is presently rare to find projects and programmes that provide 
either technical assistance or direct support to traders.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Availability of finance is essential if inclusive value chains are to succeed. 
Finance can be provided to farmers directly by companies buying the product 
or through a multipartite agreement involving company, farmer, bank and, 
perhaps, input supplier. Even where new farming activities are clearly 
profitable, cash-flow constraints may make it impossible for farmers to become 
involved if they lack funds to pay for land preparation, inputs and harvesting 
at the right time. Those working to promote inclusion should work with 
financial institutions to develop sound financing arrangements based on 
commercial principles, while being aware of the dangers of creating excessive 
indebtedness amongst farmers. 
The case studies provide several examples of successful NGO activities to 
promote inclusion. While donor and NGO support can have a very positive 
impact on value chain development, the question arises as to what happens 
when that support comes to an end. The model followed by such assistance 
often cannot be maintained once the assistance is no longer available. 
Collaboration with development agencies makes sense for the private sector 
when it has few costs to bear, but subsequently taking on those costs itself 
may not represent a sustainable business model. Care must therefore be 
taken to avoid giving a false picture of the viability of an inclusive business 
model if companies lack the resources and skills to continue implementation 
after donor support has ended.
5Introduction
As a component of CTA’s project on ‘Research, capacity building and institutional 
development in support of inclusive value chains in ACP regions’, six case 
studies were commissioned in response to a request for proposals to either (1) 
carry out original research into the factors affecting the development of 
inclusive value chains or (2) prepare case studies of successful and innovative 
inclusive value chains. All of the proposals received concerned Africa. This 
paper provides a summary of the main issues arising out of those studies, 
which were as follows:
1)	 A study by the Institut de recherches et d’application des méthodes de 
développement (IRAM) and JatroREF looked at efforts by around 15 
projects to develop value chains for jatropha in Burkina Faso and Mali. 
The majority concentrated on promoting smallholder production of the 
crop, which, although not widely exploited, has been known to farmers in 
Africa for some time. While early promotional efforts were often based 
on the possibility of exporting biodiesel, this was found to be uneconomic 
and emphasis is now on growing the crop for vegetable oil fuel (l’huile 
végétale pure, or HVP), which can be used locally as a substitute for 
diesel by mill owners or rural electrification schemes. Jatropha can also 
be used to manufacture various other products, such as soap.
2)	 The Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV), in partnership with 
the UK-based International Institute for Environment and Development 
(IIED), submitted a paper on the oilseed sector in Uganda. This primarily 
addressed sunflower development in areas of the country recovering 
from rebel activities in the 1980s and 1990s. The study described the 
business model adopted by the country’s largest oilseed processor, 
Mukwano Industries, in which farmers were supported with provision of 
specific seeds, technical assistance and guaranteed markets, in association 
with government programmes, the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD), and with support from agencies such as SNV.
INTRODUCTION
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3)	 Agronomes et vétérinaires sans frontières (AVSF) submitted a study of 
the Madagascar litchi industry, specifically about the Fanohana 
cooperative, which had succeeded in developing a profitable fair-trade 
market for its members, both for export and domestic processing before 
subsequent export. This was achieved in spite of the fact that nationally 
the litchi industry provided poor returns for farmers, for whom rice is 
the dominant crop.
4)	 Self Help Africa contributed a study on a project to promote the inclusion 
of small farmers in the cashew value chain in Benin. This was known as 
the PEPSICO Initiative for Cashew in Africa (PEPSICA) and received 
funding from PEPSICO. Cashew processing facilities were not working to 
capacity because many of the nuts were being exported raw. The project 
worked with one processing company, Tolaro Global, and with the African 
Cashew Alliance to increase the production of 1,200 farmers and to link 
them more effectively with Tolaro Global.
5)	 A study carried out by the Groupe de recherches et d’echanges 
technologiques (GRET), the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) and Jokkolabs in Senegal looked at the interaction between 
value chains and nutrition in Senegal. Specifically, it reviewed the 
experience of a pilot project to assess the impact of supplying cakry – a 
traditional dairy product of Senegal which had been fortified with iron – 
to families with small children who supplied milk to the Laiterie du 
Berger (LdB) dairy. This dairy has become well-known outside Senegal 
for its innovative and inclusive value chain activities, and has attracted 
considerable support from international dairy companies, donors and 
non-governmental organisations.
6)	 The final case study was contributed by Shoreline Services, in association 
with the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). Based on 
interviews with 300 farmers, the case study concentrated on identifying 
the factors influencing the successful inclusion of smallholders in three 
Ugandan value chains, i.e. cooking bananas, pigs and fish from aquaculture.
This paper begins with a brief summary of what is generally meant by ‘inclusive 
value chains’ and then considers the main factors underlying the success of 
such chains. Arguably, the most important factor is the development of trust 
between the parties, so this issue is reviewed in the third chapter. Farmers 
everywhere face risks: chapter four then discusses these, with a particular 
emphasis on risks from involvement in value chains. While the promotion of 
inclusive value chains can have very positive outcomes, the benefits may not be 
equally shared so the fifth chapter reviews potential gender impacts. This is 
7followed by two chapters that consider the role of producer organisations in 
such chains and other approaches to working with small farmers that do not 
necessarily involve producer organisations. The importance of value chain 
finance is then reviewed in chapter eight, followed by a consideration of the role 
of donors and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in providing technical 
assistance in chapter nine. The paper ends with some brief conclusions.
Each chapter, apart from the conclusions, provides a brief summary of the 
main recommendations arising from the research. These recommendations 
are aimed at those working to promote inclusive value chains, whether they 
are private companies, donors, NGOs, farmer organisations, banks and other 
service providers, or governments.
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1
9Small-scale farmers face numerous difficulties in moving from being producers 
of produce sold in an ad hoc way at local markets, to village or itinerant traders 
or to local mills or oilseed crushers, to producing for more sophisticated 
markets that are based on supplying products that comply with specific 
consumer demand. Such difficulties can include: poor access to planting 
materials, good animal breeds or fingerlings in the case of fish; cost and 
reliability of other inputs such as fertiliser or feed; access to veterinary 
services; lack of information about sustainable agricultural techniques to 
increase yields or about disease prevention; inadequate farmer organisation, 
limiting the economies of scale necessary to attract reliable buyers and the 
ability of farmers to negotiate from strength; insufficient transport; difficulties 
in meeting quality requirements; and lack of access to credit for equipment, 
inputs and, sometimes, for labour for land preparation, weeding and harvesting.
In general, efforts to promote inclusion attempt to address some or all of such 
constraints. The CTA Call for Proposals considered ‘inclusive value chains’ to 
be those that “obtain supply from smaller farmers, although value chains that 
actively involve small and medium-sized enterprises, such as small traders 
and processors, could also be considered”. From a review of the literature it 
can be noted that the definition of ‘inclusion’ usually refers to poverty rather 
than to size. However, while inclusive projects aim to work with the ‘poor’ the 
definition of ‘poor’ is often imprecise. Do they constitute the poorest half of 
farmers, the poorest quarter, or almost all? Is the definition of ‘poor’ universal 
or is it based on relative poverty in a particular country? Perhaps the easiest 
approach is that taken by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), which defines inclusive business as any business that 
interacts with smallholders (GIZ, 2012). But in that case the question arises as 
to what is new about the concept of inclusiveness, given that farmers have 
been interacting with buyers for generations.
What do we mean 
by ‘inclusive value 
chains’?
1
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Haggblade et al. (2012) address this question. They see actions to promote 
inclusiveness as a response to changes to production and marketing systems 
that have opened up opportunities for some rural suppliers to access new 
markets but have exposed others to new threats as a result of quantity and 
quality requirements. They argue that agribusiness investments are not 
inherently pro-poor and that the move towards stressing ‘inclusiveness’ 
responds to this, by promoting interventions that benefit the poor. Desired 
outcomes of such an approach include higher income earnings for the poor as 
well as greater participation of women and youth in value chains.
This approach does, however, raise the question of how to make value chains 
more inclusive for poor farmers without hampering competitiveness. Harper, Belt 
and Roy (2015) aim to show that it is possible and profitable for businesses to 
build and maintain such value chains, without subsidies or other non-commercial 
assistance. In other words, working with the poor can “do good and be good 
business”. They consider ‘inclusive’ value chains to be those that include and 
substantially benefit large numbers of poor people. These are often smallholder 
farmers, but could also be artisans, or small-scale retailers or customers.
A workshop organised by FAO in 2013 (FAO, 2014) provided guidance on the 
criteria necessary for businesses to be regarded as inclusive. The guidance 
stipulated that businesses should:
●	 be accessible to farmers with less assets, including women and minority 
groups
●	 use trading practices that provide benefits for smallholders, including 
profit, stable market outlets, shared risks, and access to services and 
finance
●	 not create dependency on any one value chain or buyer, and provide 
profitable diversified market options for smallholders
●	 build capacity of farmers and farmer groups according to market needs
●	 use transparent platforms and forums to identify and solve problems.
At the same time as trying to promote inclusion, there is now widespread 
appreciation that for meaningful development to be achieved it is not enough 
just to work with farmers. The particular benefit of the value chain approach is 
that it has permitted a movement away from a simple concentration on producers 
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towards an understanding that farmers are just one part of the system and that 
if other parts are not working well development assistance to farmers will 
achieve relatively little. This is, for example, now central to the approach of SNV 
whose case study notes that the organisation’s theory of change aims to 
“improve the system as a whole to contribute to sustainable poverty reduction 
and improved living conditions rather than targeting smallholder producers 
directly”. From the case studies, implementation of this approach is best 
represented by the study of Madagascar’s litchi sector, where AVSF improved 
linkages between the cooperative and potential buyers in overseas markets.
SNV’s case study of oilseeds in Uganda defined inclusion as the participation of 
smallholder famers in the value chain, by committing a part of their farm’s 
enterprise to the production of a particular crop. The inclusiveness of the chain 
is considered by SNV to be defined by the formal and informal opportunities 
provided by joining and by barriers to participation, if any exist. However, while 
chains may offer considerable scope for farmers to join, the actual level of 
inclusion will still depend on their choice to participate or not participate. In 
making this choice, risk and the level of risk aversion, discussed below, is a 
particularly important variable. The SNV study defines an inclusive business as 
a socially responsible entrepreneurial initiative, which integrates low-income 
communities in its value chain for the mutual benefit of both the company and 
the community (SNV and WBCSD, 2010). This, therefore, involves the expectation 
that large processors will relate with farmers in an equitable manner.
An important factor in inclusion is location. Even if committed to working with 
poor farmers, companies are likely to seek to minimise their costs by buying 
within easy access of their facilities and/or by organising a large number of 
farmers in one location to provide scale economies for technical support, 
purchasing and transport. The attractiveness of location to a company is not 
simply measured by distance. An organised group of farmers 100km from a 
factory along a good-quality road may be more attractive than the same 
number of scattered farmers 20km away down a pothole-filled dirt track.
Similarly, efforts to promote inclusion need to recognise that, without efforts 
to strengthen the capacity of small farmers and to achieve economies of scale, 
richer farmers are also more likely to be more attractive to companies. 
Companies will often conduct detailed assessments of potential farmers 
before deciding which ones to work with. Understandably, they usually have a 
preference for linking with those who have greater production potential, 
whether measured by land size, soil suitability, farmer skills, capacity to handle 
risk, or all of these. Thus, while inclusion does permit smallholders to play a 
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greater role in more sophisticated value chains, in many cases the smallholders 
who benefit tend to be the larger ones in any particular area. The study of pig 
farmers in Uganda, for example, found that there was a strong correlation 
between the number of pigs reared and participation in organised value 
chains. In Uganda, Vorley et al. (2015) found that being more active in oilseed 
value chains, measured by having higher proportions of land allocated to the 
crops, was correlated with total land ownership. On the other hand, the 
Ugandan study of fish farming found that the better educated and better off 
farmers were less likely to be involved in inclusive value chains, largely because 
they had alternative income-earning opportunities and, as a consequence, 
regarded farming as just a part-time activity.
The picture is somewhat different when the driver of the value chain is a farmer 
organisation. In this case, the organisation is likely to make every effort to 
ensure inclusion, and donor support is likely to make that a precondition for 
assistance. In the case of Fanohana in Madagascar, the cooperative’s statutes 
limited membership to farmers with no more than ten hectares. The average 
landholding in 2013 was just 2.6 ha.
Also influencing the adoption of an inclusive business model is the fact that 
products targeted at export markets, in particular, are increasingly becoming 
subject to certification. Exporters need to be sure that the farmers they work 
with are capable of meeting the standards required by the certifiers. Unless 
donor support is available, farmers need to have the financial resources to 
provide facilities (e.g. toilets and washing facilities for employees) specified by 
certifiers as well as the education levels and technical skills to carry out the 
necessary production practices.
Certification continues to expand but, unfortunately, Kuit and Waarts (2014) 
conclude, from a review of many certification programmes, that there is little 
evidence that farmers are benefitting from it. This conclusion is supported by 
a study cited by the Madagascar case study, which found that litchi farmers 
certified as GlobalGAP did not receive statistically higher prices than non-
certified farmers (Subervie and Vagneron, 2011). Unlike the Fanohana 
cooperative’s investment in fair-trade certification, which was the main focus 
of the case study, GlobalGAP was driven by exporters, not producers. Certified 
farmers were, however, able to sell greater quantities as a result of GlobalGAP 
certification, providing support for another emerging conclusion about 
certification, that it is becoming more of a precondition for selling products 
than a way of obtaining higher returns. Given that Madagascar’s litchi 
exporters limit exports in order to guarantee reasonable returns on European 
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markets, the conclusion must be that higher sales for certified farmers result 
in lower sales for non-certified farmers. As certified farmers tend to be much 
larger than those who are not certified, certification in this case would appear 
to be working directly against inclusion of smaller farmers. Indeed, if the 
industry decided to go for 100% GlobalGAP certification, smaller farmers 
could be excluded altogether.
Competition from other buyers can challenge the contract farming model that 
involves contractual arrangements with farmers to provide inputs and 
technical support in exchange for a commitment to sell the crop or deliver 
animals to the company supplying the support (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). 
Successful attempts to provide inclusive support could attract other buyers 
who may be less keen on providing production support, such as inputs on 
credit, while being in a position to offer prices as good as, if not better, than 
companies following inclusive business models. Such ‘side-selling’ was reported 
to varying degrees by all four of the studies that looked at value chains involving 
contractual relationships.
As a consequence, the oilseeds study from Uganda argues that development 
agencies pursuing a vertical coordination model of inclusive value chain 
development need to consider working with more diversified sets of buyers, 
including small traders. It notes that “innovative inclusion efforts are shaped 
by the realities of oilseed production and marketing”. Clearly, strong linkages 
between companies and farmers become much more difficult when there are 
multiple competitive buyers operating in rural areas, where production is 
primarily for the domestic market and where there is little premium for 
providing high-quality or safe products. For this reason contract farming has 
rarely been successful for staple crop production and markets for crops such 
as oilseeds bear many similarities to those for staples.
Finally, the study of the Senegalese dairy sector was somewhat different 
from the other case studies in that it examined an attempt to use an existing 
value chain to promote nutritional improvements. At the same time it also 
aimed to benefit the dairy, by tying supplies of fortified cakry to milk sales by 
producers. ‘Inclusion’ in this context meant the extent to which producers 
were able to qualify to receive cakry, which was based both on the age and 
number of qualifying children and the level of milk deliveries. Particular 
difficulties were faced in the dry season, when milk deliveries are low. Initially, 
cakry was given to producers when they sold more than one litre of milk per 
cow per week. In the dry season this had to be reduced to 0.5 litres and, 
subsequently, 0.3 litres.
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BOX 1: INCLUSIVE VALUE CHAINS
●	 Seek to maximise income-earning opportunities for poor farmers 
by allowing them to address new opportunities presented by 
agribusiness.
●	 Usually involve donor and NGO facilitation, but there are good 
examples of development by the private sector.
●	 Emphasise the development of the whole chain and not solely 
upgrading of farmers.
●	 Aim to provide profitable options for farmers with fewer assets.
●	 May still exclude some farmers on grounds of location, farm size 
and natural resources, capacity to meet increasingly strict 
standards, and farmer risk aversion.
●	 Can be jeopardised by competition from other buyers, leading to 
side-selling.
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The case studies identified a wide range of factors contributing to a greater 
smallholder involvement in value chains. Provision of inputs and technical 
support are usually central to the development of more inclusive value chains. 
In the case of cashew in Benin, quality-testing equipment, known as Kernel 
Outcome Result (KOR) kits, was supplied by one processor, Tolaro Global. This 
enabled producers to test the quality of cashew nuts before delivery to Tolaro 
and also negotiate better prices with other buyers, which producers were 
previously unable to do. The company’s quality control manager also trained 
the farmers on developing and maintaining high-quality production and on 
the use of KOR kits.
The introduction of sustainable agricultural practices for cashew producers by 
the company, and attention to the supply of inputs for this to be achieved, 
enabled farmers to access more remunerative markets as a result of better 
seedlings, improved weeding, pruning, organic composting, tree spacing, back-
burning, harvesting and post-harvest handling. These and other efforts resulted 
in average yield increases from 350 kg/ha in 2012 to 550 kg/ha in 2014.
The introduction of a ‘lead farmer’ system in Benin also proved very successful. 
These farmers received training on appropriate technologies and practices 
and shared these with groups of other farmers through practical demonstrations 
in orchards in their villages. Grouping of farmers to negotiate with and sell to 
buyers provided the economies of scale necessary to achieve higher prices 
through direct linkages with the buyers. Lead farmers managed around 40 
producers each. Their incentive to be a lead farmer was that they had priority 
access to improved planting materials.
Although the business model in Uganda was not strictly a contract farming 
agreement, as the company did not supply seeds on credit, farmers still benefitted 
from closer linkages with Mukwano. The main benefit was an agreement to buy 
What are the main factors 
affecting success of  
inclusive chains?
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their produce at an agreed minimum price, as long as the hybrid seed supplied 
by the company had been used. Other benefits included having access to planting 
material that was likely to result in much higher yields than other varieties, 
extension support, and the fact that the company organised transportation. In 
order to have the opportunity to buy hybrid sunflower from farmers and then 
sell it to the company, some traders were apparently buying the seed imported 
by the company and selling it to farmers. As a crop, sunflower was appreciated 
because it matured quickly, was easy to manage and could be grown as a second 
crop after the more traditional crops in the area.
In Madagascar, the cooperative was able to obtain benefits for its members 
through a variety of means. First, good planning, together with well-organised 
logistics and transport organisation, made the cooperative more efficient 
than traders who carried out speculative purchasing visits and would often 
have to decline to purchase fruit because their trucks were full. It also enabled 
the cooperative to control costs. Second, with assistance from AVSF, the 
cooperative was able to identify higher priced markets involving certification 
(fair-trade and organic) and value addition through both bulk processing and 
preparation of consumer products for sale at retail level. Third, by negotiating 
pre-financing with buyers and by using sales contracts as guarantees for 
loans, the cooperative was able to compete with traders who offered advances 
to farmers. Also, farmers reported benefitting from improved access to 
production and post-harvest training.
The litchi case study also considered that sales to the cooperative made 
farmers more active participants in the value chain, as they were involved in 
decision-making, and that this increased their status in their communities. 
However, with success can come problems. Farmers were reportedly unhappy 
that the cooperative was not in a position to buy all of their production, as it 
concentrated on supplying only certified markets that were limited in size, 
and did not attempt to compete with traders for non-certified supply.
Whether formal contracts involving small farmers are needed is often a topic 
for discussion. In general, verbal agreements can often be adequate as long 
as safeguards are taken to ensure that farmers are fully aware of what they 
are agreeing to. In the case of jatropha in Mali one company did introduce 
formal contracts to be signed by producers. Another tried something similar 
but this was resisted by producers as it was considered both too complex for 
a small emerging industry and unnecessary. One consideration was the lack of 
reliable data on yields that could be used to calculate production quantities to 
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be sold by the farmer and inserted in the contract1. Another company just 
agreed a simple ‘moral commitment’ with farmers.
Despite different arrangements being used, agreements reached by the 
various jatropha companies, particularly in Mali, aimed to achieve an integrated 
approach by agreeing to: a guarantee to purchase jatropha seeds and pay 
cash on delivery; discuss the price at the beginning of every season; provide 
planting material and assist with establishing village nurseries; provide 
extension advice for both jatropha and other crops; provide pre-financing; 
and support farmer group formation. In turn, producers agreed to follow 
specified technical requirements, sell only to the company with which they 
had an agreement, harvest and sell only mature seeds, and support group 
formation activities. However, interviews by the case study team ascertained 
that farmers generally had an inadequate understanding of the terms of the 
agreement, particularly when it was reached between the processor and the 
farmer organisation, rather than directly with the producer.
For any company wishing to become involved in inclusive value chain linkages 
or even contractual linkages that are not particularly inclusive, it is essential to 
understand both the agricultural practices and skills of the farmers and the 
socio-cultural environment. Particular difficulties were experienced in the dairy 
sector of Senegal, both in developing the dairy value chain and in attempting 
to introduce fortified food for children. These were caused by the multiplicity 
of family and community groupings within a pastoralist context, which included: 
a household (ménage), which may include a man and one or more wives; a 
gallé, approximating an extended family, including parents and adult children, 
and usually associated with one communal herd of animals; and a wuro (village 
or community), that could consist of several gallé. This complexity caused 
difficulties in identifying who was responsible for milk production and, in the 
case of supplying fortified foods, in identifying who should qualify to receive 
such foods, when the qualification was based on milk deliveries.
1 See UNIDROIT/FAO/IFAD “Legal Guide on Contract Farming” (2015) for a full discussion on 
contractual issues.
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BOX 2: WAYS OF INCREASING CHANCES OF SUCCESS
●	 Ensure that technical packages introduced will result in a significant 
increase in income for farmers, with minimal additional risk, if any.
●	 Develop a full understanding of the socio-economic structure of 
the area and the implications of this for value chain development.
●	 While working to ensure inclusiveness, ensure that farmers selected 
do have the potential to take advantage of the opportunities 
provided.
●	 Consider options for group and/or farmer organisation development 
appropriate to the socio-economic context.
●	 Ensure that all farmers involved endorse agreements reached with 
group or farmer organisation leaders.
●	 Address smallholder credit constraints by providing inputs and 
other assistance on credit.
●	 Organise meetings with farmers to ensure that they understand 
the implications of such credit in terms of repayment through 
deductions at the time of delivery and the long-term benefits of 
honouring repayment commitments.
●	 Seek to identify and develop new markets that can offer higher 
returns in a cost-effective way. Options include sales to new buyers 
or countries, branding, processing, quality upgrading, certification, 
and exploitation of the products’ origin.
3
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Both in traditional and more modern chains, buyers need to trust farmers to 
supply agreed products, particularly when formal contracts or unofficial 
agreements have been reached that involve input supply, technical assistance 
or other financial advances. Farmers have to trust their buyers to provide the 
agreed support and to make payments on a timely basis. Buyers further along 
the chain must trust intermediaries who work directly with the farmers. 
Developing such trust can be complex and time-consuming and the role of 
outsiders, such as NGOs, in supporting this can be very beneficial. For example, 
the Madagascar case study reported that the involvement of AVSF overcame 
the doubts of a litchi processor about the wisdom of working with a cooperative.
The complexity of arrangements in the Senegalese dairy industry, described at 
the end of the previous chapter, tended to cause confusion among the 
community and contributed to the development of a measure of mistrust. Also, 
farmers alleged that the dairy did not send collection vehicles as agreed and 
that farmers considered that the payment they eventually received did not 
reflect the quantities that were collected from them. This was attributed to the 
lack of formal weighing at collection and to reductions in weight due to rejection 
on quality grounds when the milk reached the dairy. Such clear issues of trust 
suggest the need for greater communication between the dairy and the farmers 
and the possibility of organising occasional visits to the dairy so that producers 
could witness milk reception, grading and weighing in person.
The PEPSICA cashew project promoted open discussions between all relevant 
actors prior to and during design of the project, which facilitated a climate of 
trust between the stakeholders. Later in the season the willingness of the 
leading cashew processing company to pay immediately on delivery was an 
important factor in ensuring continuity of market linkages. Even so, difficulties 
were experienced. As reported by the case study authors: “when the prices 
increased, the farmers didn’t want to sell their cashew nut at the prices agreed 
How can trust be  
promoted?3
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with the processor. When the price decreased, the processor didn’t want to 
pay the price agreed with the farmers”. This is a common problem with 
contract farming-type arrangements and creative ways of minimising the 
danger of contract disruption need to be developed. One approach is to have 
two payment arrangements: one part of the farmer’s delivery is paid for at the 
contracted price while the other part is purchased at the market price.
In the Ugandan oilseeds sector the leading processor was to some extent a 
victim of its own business model. Its success in building up production through 
importation of hybrid seeds attracted other sunflower seed buyers, thus 
creating incentives for farmers to breach their contract. The incentive to side 
sell was increased because the processor was very slow in paying the farmers, 
making it difficult to compete with traders buying for cash, even if at a slightly 
lower price. In Mali, one jatropha project found that some of the farmers it 
was supporting were side-selling to other buyers who were offering a higher 
price for the jatropha seeds. However, other farmers continued to support the 
project because they saw the potential advantage of the planned usage of 
fuel from jatropha for rural electrification.
Promotion of trust in various agricultural sectors has been shown to be 
enhanced by the existence of multi-stakeholder organisations, or commodity 
associations, that have the capacity to bring together the large-scale private 
sector, smaller traders, farmers and others working to support the sector 
(Shepherd et al., 2009). For example, the Oilseed sub-Sector Uganda Platform 
(OSSUP) has played an important role in promoting the industry and in 
improving linkages between the various parties. OSSUP was developed by 
SNV and other Dutch organisations, working together with the Uganda 
Oilseeds Producers and Processors Association and Makerere University.
Despite the role of OSSUP, there were still trust problems in the Ugandan 
oilseeds sector. As is often the case, these seem to have been mainly related 
to the price paid. The quickest way to lose farmers is if they feel cheated. 
Although the company advertised its buying prices by radio and other means, 
farmers complained that they were not receiving that price. This may have 
been because the price given out by the company included commissions 
given to their site coordinators and agents, and that this was not understood 
by farmers. Another cause of dissent was that farmers were required to pay 
cash for seeds supplied by the company but were only paid for the output 
after 2-3 months. Farmers had to wait for agents and coordinators to bulk up 
the production to send to the company, receive payment and then return it to 
the farmers.
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BOX 3: WAYS OF PROMOTING TRUST
●	 Maximise communication between buyers and farmers. Hold 
regular meetings to ensure that farmers understand what is 
expected of them and why.
●	 Organise meetings with local authorities to ensure their full 
understanding of the arrangements.
●	 Ensure that farmers fully understand and are in agreement with 
the buyer’s requirements in terms of cultivation practices, input 
use, harvesting and delivery.
●	 Explain payment arrangements, the method of price calculation 
and any deductions for inputs supplied on credit or advances given 
to farmers.
●	 Agree on quality criteria and on how quality shall be measured. 
Make arrangements for farmers or their representatives to be 
present when quality is assessed.
●	 Pay farmers on delivery or as soon as possible thereafter.
●	 Where possible, work with local intermediaries respected by the 
farmers to minimise the potential for disagreement.
●	 Encourage the development of industry-wide associations with 
membership drawn from all stakeholders.
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Farmers face numerous risks and the case studies covered many of these. Risk 
minimisation is a major factor in farmers’ production and marketing decisions 
and, as already noted, in their decisions about whether or not to take part in 
inclusive value chains. Such risks are usually faced, whether farmers are part 
of inclusive value chains or are just making ad hoc sales on local markets, but 
there is an expectation that inclusive value chains will involve an element of 
risk sharing (FAO, 2014). Belonging to organised chains can often reduce some 
risks by, for example, providing easier access to pest control chemicals or 
technical advice in the event of an infestation. Under formal contractual 
arrangements there may be an element of risk sharing. For example, large 
companies with long-term investments may agree to waive repayment for 
inputs provided if production difficulties are experienced, or, at least, defer 
repayment until the following year.
The study of three value chains in Uganda by Shoreline and ILRI identified 
several major risks. Bananas are subject to Bacterial Wilt, nematodes and 
Black Sigatoka disease and a major shift of the cultivation area to the west of 
the country has been reported as a result of soil exhaustion in previous 
production areas. Climate change is also beginning to have an impact. Other 
banana problems include praedial larceny (the theft of crops from the field) 
and damage from roaming animals. There is also a significant marketing risk 
in view of the perishability of the product and frequent shortage of transport. 
Pig chains in Uganda reported that swine fever outbreaks are common and 
can wipe out the entire stock. Fish farming has inherent production and 
marketing risks. Protecting the quality of the water and maintaining the cold 
chain necessary to keep the fish fresh from harvest to the final consumer are 
costly undertakings that can easily go wrong. Fish pond poisoning is not 
unknown. The unreliable quality of both fingerlings and feed are also risks. 
Perhaps surprisingly, there is also a market price risk as farmed fish competes 
with captured fish, the output of which is extremely variable.
What are the risks 
faced by farmers?4
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Also in Uganda, the study of oilseeds, found that risk factors played a major 
role in farmers’ decision-making, particularly for sunflower. Risks associated 
with the market, such as price risk, timeliness of payment or, simply, whether 
it would be possible to sell the product, were often perceived by farmers as 
being more important than production risks. Farmers seeking greater inclusion 
were presented with a complex risk equation in balancing the opportunities 
from increased cash-crop production against the risks and the possible loss of 
food production as a consequence of concentrating on oilseeds.
In the case of litchi, production is very responsive to water and the subsoil 
cannot be allowed to become dry. Average production in Madagascar has 
reportedly varied between 407 kg per household in 2007 and 165 kg in 2008. 
This production risk can be offset, as prices can double in years of poor rainfall, 
even though the case study suggested that much of the production is never 
marketed. Browning of the litchi and post-harvest decay during storage and 
transportation are currently controlled by using sulphur dioxide fumigation 
although limited quantities of fruit are exported by air freight without this. 
Fumigation must be carried out as soon as possible after harvest but farmers 
in remote districts run the risk of not being able to get their fruit to fumigation 
centres in good time. With this need for speedy transport, smaller farmers 
often have to accept the offer made by the first trader to arrive, even though 
the price may be low, for fear of not being able to find a buyer in time. Further 
risks faced by Madagascar’s litchi farmers include the time at which the fruit 
reaches maturity. Almost all of the country’s litchi exports are timed for sale 
in Europe during the Christmas period. If the climate results in the litchis 
maturing either early or late they are more or less worthless. Vessels to take 
the fruit to Europe are pre-booked and prices rise in the 3-4 days prior to the 
scheduled sailing when exporters need to get sufficient supply to meet their 
orders. The crop can also be damaged by cyclones. Given these risks it is no 
surprise that litchi is just one of many crops grown by Madagascar’s farmers. 
In addition to rice, breadfruit and jackfruit, cassava, bananas, sunflower, and 
coffee are commonly cultivated.
Farmers entering into contracts to produce new crops, in particular, are often 
dependent on the companies they work with to provide them with a realistic 
assessment of likely yields and, hence, potential profitability. They face the 
risk that, by accident or design, false expectations are encouraged. Shepherd 
(2013) noted that jatropha yields had been significantly exaggerated by its 
proponents in other countries and the JatroREF study found that yields were 
below expectations in West Africa. In turn, these yields were jeopardising the 
viability of the processors and in both Burkina Faso and Mali processing is now 
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close to being abandoned. Original plans were for plots of jatropha to be 
grown on relatively poor soils; these were subsequently replaced by promotion 
of intercropping with maize, groundnut and black-eyed pea, or by encouraging 
the use of jatropha as a hedge.
Another risk-related issue to arise from the jatropha study was that 
commitments to provide advances to farmers were sometimes not honoured 
and financial difficulties experienced by the processors meant that some were 
unable to purchase all of the farmers’ production. A further concern was that 
while the harvest took place at a time when families had significant expenses – 
such as the purchase of food to bridge the gap when there was limited food 
availability, the purchase of seeds and fertiliser and the paying of school fees – 
and was thus thought to be a potentially beneficial crop, it also coincided with 
a time when they had significant other work to do, such as land preparation, 
weeding and the harvest of other crops. This emphasises the need for promoters 
of inclusive value chains to be fully aware of the labour and other socio-
economic implications of farmers taking on new production activities.
As noted earlier, a factor influencing milk production is its seasonality. For 
producers this is not so much a risk as an annual occurrence that they have 
learned to live with. For dairies, however, such seasonality can present 
considerable problems. If they install facilities adequate to handle production 
at its peak they will be running far below their capacity during the low season 
and risk being unable to cover their costs. If they install facilities insufficient 
to handle peak production they risk alienating their producers by being unable 
to take all of their milk. During the dry season in Senegal, LdB experiences 
problems both because of lower milk yields and because of seasonal 
transhumance of the pastoralists. The company’s cost-controlling responses 
have included changing collection arrangements to maximise milk collections 
per trip and the use of motorised tricycles for collection, thus reducing 
transport costs.
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5BOX 4: WAYS OF REDUCING FARMER RISK●	 Recognise importance of risk minimisation in farmers’ decision-making and plan their involvement in value chain development with this in mind.
●	 Conduct a full analysis of the socio-economic viability of 
smallholder involvement in the value chain, including a reliable 
assessment of yield potential based on local conditions.
●	 Consider how risks should be shared between buyers and farmers 
to ensure sustainable long-term relationships.
●	 Promote development of new varieties that can, among other 
things, help overcome consequences of climate change and 
address disease problems.
●	 Ensure appropriate post-harvest systems are in place to maintain 
quality and minimise delays between harvest and delivery.
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While activities to link farmers in more sophisticated markets may well lead to 
broader inclusion, it cannot be assumed that all within a farming family will 
benefit. Depending on the particular culture of an area, women, in particular, 
may see few rewards and may actually lose out. In Senegal, for example, the 
dairy case study found that payment was more often than not collected by the 
men, even if they played little part in rearing the animals and milking the 
cows. However, field research also found examples of where men were quite 
happy for women to handle the money from milk production. Unfortunately, 
during the pilot project to use the dairy industry to promote rural nutrition, 
the information about the project was shared mainly with the men. It became 
apparent that a proportion had not passed on this information to their wives. 
The project concluded that it should have conducted specific training activities 
targeting women.
In Benin, men usually take control of cash-crop production. Women accounted 
for less than 10% of cashew farmers and none were selected to be a lead 
farmer to provide advice to other farmers. Although women do much of the 
work on cash crops, the financial aspects are nearly always controlled by men. 
Thus, as elsewhere, there is always the danger that greater inclusion will 
increase the workload for women while financially benefitting only men. 
Furthermore, women do not usually have land rights and therefore it is difficult 
for them to own cashew orchards. In trying to address this problem, the next 
phase of the project has been designed to incorporate women through 
promoting intercropping of leguminous crops in cashew orchards and 
establishing apiaries in orchards, both of which have the dual function of 
providing a source of income to women and increasing cashew productivity.
In contrast, the study of value chains in Uganda found that pig farming was 
more the preserve of women, who were involved in animal rearing and 
marketing as well as decision-making about the proceeds from sales. The 
What are the gender 
implications of greater 
chain involvement?
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Ugandan oilseeds study, however, noted that women were generally more 
concerned about the importance of growing food crops and were worried 
about sunflower cultivation attracting pests and causing soil exhaustion.
The West African jatropha case study found that meetings of producers to 
discuss the industry were relatively rare, around two or three times a year. 
The one exception was a women’s cooperative in Mali, which met twice a 
month. However, on the whole women expressed dissatisfaction with the 
introduction of jatropha as a commercial crop because they were often 
required to do the harvesting but the crop was usually sold by the men. In 
some cases there was the opportunity to make soap from by-products of 
processing and some women also purchased HVP in order to make high-
quality soap for sale.
BOX 5: WAYS OF ADDRESSING GENDER CONSIDERATIONS
●	 Ensure maximum consultation with both women and men prior to 
reaching a contractual agreement.
●	 Develop mechanisms for sharing information with both women and 
men throughout the contract.
●	 Be aware of implications of contracted production on women’s food 
crop production and ensure this is fully discussed with both women 
and men.
●	 Be aware of the implication of new value chain activities on the 
workloads of both women and men.
●	 Wherever possible, ensure that contracts are signed, or agreements 
reached, with the family members doing the bulk of the work and 
that payment is made to those family members.
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Most of the case studies touched on the role of producer organisations and 
cooperatives in facilitating value chain linkages. Notable among the successes 
was the Fanohana cooperative in Madagascar, which, as described in Box 6, 
succeeded in upgrading production of litchi and other crops, negotiating fair-
trade and other export contracts for its farmers, and adding value to products 
by working with a local cannery. Such markets could not have been developed 
by farmers acting individually and fair-trade certification generally depends 
on farmers working through a farmer organisation that is able to apply the 
fair-trade premium for community development purposes.
Can producer  
organisations play  
an important role?
6
BOX 6: DEVELOPING THE MARKET FOR LITCHI IN MADAGASCAR
Prior to the involvement of AVSF in supporting the development of 
the Madagascar litchi industry, there had been another attempt by an 
NGO to work with a cooperative to develop litchi exports in 2003. This 
reportedly failed because of the limited role given to the cooperative 
leaders and the inadequate attention paid to logistics, with the 
disastrous consequence that most of the litchis purchased from 
members had to be thrown away. However, the experience did alert a 
few cooperative members to the possibilities of grouped sales to 
exporters, which they carried out in 2005 and 2006, but not through 
the cooperative. In 2007, AVSF selected three cooperatives to work 
with from among 12 farmer organisations. A fourth was added soon 
after, following pressure from the cooperative itself to become 
involved. These cooperatives were subsequently merged into one 
union, Fanohana, before it eventually became a cooperative in its own 
right, rather than a union. Farmers became members of Fanohana, 
rather than the original cooperatives, thus enabling it to offer a 
consistent service to all 265 members.
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In 2008-09 an agreement was reached with a fair-trade organisation 
in France and with a processor in Madagascar to supply 14 tonnes of 
frozen litchi pulp (equivalent to 35 tonnes of fresh litchi). Each of the 
152 members was given a quota of 320 kg, representing 5-10% of their 
annual production. The fair-trade premium was not paid to the farmers 
but served to increase the funds of the cooperatives. From 2010, the 
French buyer required production certified as organic and cooperative 
members were successfully certified. Supplies of organic litchi pulp 
increased from an initial 14 tonnes of pulp to 42 tonnes in 2011-12.
Following this success with pulp exports, the cooperative, with support 
from AVSF, identified fair-trade markets for fresh litchi, but the 
arrangement only lasted for a year, following failure to agree on the 
price. However, in 2012-13 agreement was reached with a major French 
fair-trade importer and, working through two local exporters, Fanohana 
was able to export 166 tonnes of fresh litchi. Many farmers from the 
cooperative had also been certified as GlobalGAP compliant and in 2013-
14 exports amounting to 243 tonnes were certified as fair trade and 
GlobalGAP. In 2012-13 Fanohana also developed a market for fair-trade 
litchi with a local processor, which made sales of syrup in retail units to 
France, with sales doubling the following year. Trials were also made 
with dried fruit exports, which were seen as a way of expanding the 
European market beyond the traditional Christmas period and making 
exports possible when no ships for fresh litchi were being chartered.
The strengthening of the management skills of the cooperative had 
enabled committee members to carry out the necessary audits of 
farmers’ land in order to guarantee that organic and fair-trade 
procedures were being followed and to facilitate traceability. Contracted 
volumes were allocated on the basis of production potential and 
delivery schedules were worked out and agreed with the members. 
Committee members also negotiated with transporters in Tamatave, 
the export port, and the capital Antananarivo. Following the success 
with litchi, Fanohana diversified into marketing other crops grown by 
its members, including pepper, vanilla and cinnamon. As with 
Madagascar’s rural traders, this permitted cooperative staff and 
facilities to be productively employed over a much longer period, when 
there was no demand for litchi, and also generated working capital.
Source: Adrien Brondel, AVSF
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Approaches of NGOs to working with farmer organisations varied. AVSF in 
Madagascar decided that it would only work with established organisations and 
would not try to set up new organisations in order to deliver technical assistance. 
Self Help Africa in Benin also worked to strengthen existing cooperatives. On 
the other hand, SNV’s work in Uganda involved consolidating farmers into 
groups and then consolidating those groups into larger organisations.
Only 102 of the 1,200 farmers targeted by the Benin cashew project were 
initially cooperative members but as a result of the project 850 people signed 
up to one of the cooperatives. Negotiations on prices were carried out by 
cooperative board members or, in some cases, representatives of smaller 
groups, who returned to the farmers to discuss the deal as a group before 
proceeding. To ensure full transparency during the sales process, producers 
transported their product to the cooperative and received a delivery slip. The 
nuts that were collected were delivered to the buyer who paid on the spot. 
Producers then presented their slips to the cooperative to receive payment.
In Uganda, farmer groups were initially consolidated into High-level Producer 
Organisations (HLPOs), which each represented between five and ten groups, 
and had the economies of scale to procure inputs collectively. Subsequently, 
efforts were made to merge these HLPOs into formal cooperatives that would 
be able to autonomously engage in business activities. However, their potential 
to function as independent value chain partners was not fully achieved and 
the cooperatives remained dependent on the seed supply and extension 
services offered by the processor. While better prices can be achieved through 
economies of scale, few of the organisations had been able to develop 
sufficient capital to pay farmers in cash, given that the company only paid 
after three months. Thus, despite the fact that farmers did show some loyalty 
to their organisation, the organisations were still subject to side-selling by 
their members to cash-paying traders.
A further, rarely considered, difficulty for farmer organisations, was that 
cooperatives in Uganda were obliged to prepare formal accounts and submit 
annual tax declarations. This put them at a disadvantage to informal traders 
because of the possibility of paying tax, the costs involved in preparing 
accounts, and the fact that, in Uganda, some of their smaller potential 
customers were also in the informal sector and were unable to provide the 
necessary documentation.
Apparently independent of external assistance, over 1,000 fish farmers in 
Uganda, seeking to avoid reliance on selling through spot markets, established 
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a fish farmers’ cooperative society. This aimed to help members have access 
to essential services and inputs, while also developing market linkages and 
adding value through sales to a company that marketed fresh fish to 
supermarkets and also made fish sausages.
In the West African jatropha industry, the various processors used different 
approaches to link up with farmers. Some sought to strengthen producer 
organisations so that they could provide extension advice and bulk up their 
members’ production for subsequent collection. Others collaborated with 
farmer groups but purchased from their members individually. One, Mali 
Biocarburant, originally involved around 3000 producers as shareholders of 
the company but changed its approach when it became clear that production 
would be insufficient to develop the planned export market. Instead, it worked 
with a large cooperative to organise the farmers into 15 groups, with the 
intention that they would produce HVP. Another company decided to set up 
an informal body that could be developed over time as needs emerged, rather 
than creating the structure unnecessarily for a farmer organisation. Only one 
company chose to work directly with individual farmers.
The difficulties faced by the jatropha industry as a whole do not permit any 
conclusion as to which approach was the most successful. The relatively small 
quantities produced in both Burkina Faso and Mali, together with the small 
marketing and processing margins available, meant that funds to support 
farmer organisation development were limited. The low profitability of jatropha 
and small individual production levels also meant that farmers faced difficulties 
in paying their membership subscriptions. In fact farmers seemed to have 
rapidly formed the opinion that there was little economic benefit in jatropha 
and were thus perhaps less enthusiastic about cooperating than they would 
have been with more profitable developments. However, some groups, formed 
originally to promote production, continued to operate subsequently to carry 
out other activities such as nursery operation or marketing. On the other hand, 
groups that received most initial support were reported to be largely inactive.
The oilseeds case study from Uganda argued that development agencies 
needed to critically reflect on the comparative advantage of producer 
organisations. The evidence presented by that study and by the jatropha 
study would seem to support that view, although the Benin and Madagascar 
cases both showed cooperatives in a positive light, albeit with the advantage 
of considerable technical and financial support. Certainly, both farmer 
associations and cooperatives have in the past seemed to be a bottomless pit 
for development resources. Strong evidence that there are major problems 
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with such organisations, at least as far as carrying out value chain activities 
is concerned, is usually met with the response that additional time and funds 
are required, rather than serious consideration of the development model.
BOX 7: WAYS OF WORKING WITH PRODUCER ORGANISATIONS
●	 Where possible, ensure that producer organisations working in 
inclusive value chains are financially sound (independent of 
subsidies) and able to finance their activities.
●	 Where funding is required, develop a detailed business plan to 
ensure that the organisations can be self-sustaining by completion 
of the project.
●	 Maximise communication between buyers and farmer organisations 
to identify the most appropriate models for farmer organisation 
involvement, including working through small groups.
●	 Encourage organisations carrying out value chain functions to 
have professional management teams for these activities and 
support such teams with appropriate training.
●	 Identify and facilitate linkages with new market outlets that producer 
organisations may on their own have difficulty in assessing.
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One lesson learned from the various case studies is that adaptation of the 
business model as the project proceeds is often very necessary. In the Ugandan 
oilseeds sector, the company started out by working with individual farmers. 
Contracts stipulated exclusivity in selling the oilseeds to that company when 
the inputs it supplied were used, even though the seeds were not supplied on 
credit. There were complaints that the company was exploiting its monopoly 
import role. At one time the contract with farmers mentioned the possibility 
of legal action for non-compliance, although such action against small farmers 
would be practically impossible. With NGO assistance, the company then 
moved on to working with farmer groups, as described earlier. The hope was 
that the embedded services, such as extension, would lead to loyalty from the 
farmers when it came to selling their crop. Individual farmers were still 
required to sign contracts and these were to be witnessed by the village 
council chairman. In practice, however, such contracts appeared to have 
achieved little, with the only real sanction open to the company being to 
refuse access to the hybrid seed the following season.
With all of these problems, the company’s programme to tie exclusive access 
to seed to an exclusive market for the product was effectively abandoned and 
by 2008 it was estimated that around 40 percent of the company’s ‘contracted’ 
oilseeds were actually bought by traders, including in remote areas that the 
company’s programme had not reached. The number of cash-paying traders 
had continued to grow while the company continued to pay slowly through an 
arrangement involving agents and coordinators. From 2012, the company 
reportedly adjusted its programme to more of a marketing contract. However, 
it retained site coordinators and piloted a loan scheme with a local bank that 
both enabled the coordinators to pay cash for the crop, thus avoiding the 
payment delay, and reduced the company’s transaction costs.
What are the alternative 
approaches to linking 
farmers with buyers?
7
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Such changes in approach are fairly common under contract farming 
arrangements as companies struggle to identify the best method of working 
with farmers. While, in the case above, the company tried to find ways of 
avoiding working with individual farmers, there have been other examples 
where companies have found working through farmer organisations to be 
unsatisfactory and have decided to work directly with farmers. In other cases, 
companies may have recognised the need to work with groups but have 
struggled to identify the best way of coordinating them, as appointment of 
local coordinators can lead to rivalries.
In the case of the Senegalese dairy industry, formal contractual arrangements 
were not entered into by the dairy, LdB. The case study attributed this to the 
fact that most producers were pastoralists, and hence very mobile, so would 
not be supplying on a regular basis. Contracts were also deemed unsuitable 
because of literacy problems. However, to try to ensure that the milk supplied 
to the dairy was delivered by producers familiar with its requirements in terms 
of quality, all families or extended families were provided with numbered, 18 
kg-capacity churns, and this registered number was the basis for the monthly 
payments. To maximise their cash income producers would sometimes sell all 
of their fresh milk and consume powdered milk, with possible implications for 
family nutrition.
There has been a tendency in development work to ignore the traditional 
trading sector. Traders are often portrayed as ‘unscrupulous middlemen’ who 
cream off profits from the chain while contributing little. Thus NGOs and 
others have often tried to develop market linkages that by-pass traders and 
connect farmers directly with the end buyers. Where the products involved 
are highly perishable there are good reasons for this, as an extra hand in the 
chain could slow activities and lead to loss of quality. Exporters of fresh fruit 
and vegetables, for example, would not usually want to procure their products 
through traders.
However, in the case of less perishable products, the attempt to by-pass the 
trader may not only be misguided but also a recipe for the failure of the whole 
venture. Traders are not going to suddenly disappear just because an inclusive 
value chain is being developed. As seen in the Ugandan oilseeds case, for 
example, their capacity to offer transport, travel to remote areas, buy small 
quantities per farmer and pay in cash meant that farmers were often inclined 
to sell to them despite their agreements with the company. A further issue to 
emerge was that traders were usually less fussy about product quality than 
the more demanding standards of the lead company working with SNV, largely 
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because their customers, the competing oilseed crushers, were themselves 
less demanding. As the SNV study puts it, “traders have not been side-lined 
by the vertical coordination efforts of other [value chain] actors”. Farmers like 
to keep their access to different marketing channels open and not put all their 
eggs in one basket.
Ugandan traders are able to be competitive in this situation in part because 
they handle a range of products and are thus able to work throughout the year 
to build up capital. Litchi traders in Madagascar also handled a range of crops 
throughout the year. However, in some cases the problems faced by traditional 
traders are not dissimilar to those faced by companies who attempt to develop 
inclusive linkages. Traders build up linkages with farmers over time and these 
are often trust-based or based on kinship. Advances from traders to farmers 
are not unknown but, as with more formal contract farming, these advances 
are sometimes misused and the production sold to others. However the SNV 
case noted that, by and large, traders did tend to respect each other’s ‘territory’. 
Despite their apparent capacity to pay cash, traders invariably reported that 
their biggest problem was the availability of working or operating capital.
In Madagascar traders face considerable risks, particularly from long queues 
at the exporters’ premises and the possibility of being unable to sell their 
products to exporters for reasons of poor quality. The alternative local market 
is small and low-priced. The case study noted, however, that farmers and 
traders often had longstanding relationships and sometimes reached verbal 
supply agreements. In remote areas there was often only one trader operating. 
Studies have estimated that around 3,000 traders handle litchi in the country, 
as well as other crops. More professional traders own their own vehicles. They 
often provide advances to farmers, primarily to guarantee supply and know in 
advance how much of the crop they will be able to buy. Sometimes the larger 
traders provide extension advice, in an attempt to improve quality and grading. 
At the other extreme some occasional traders include people who sometimes 
hire vehicles to go on a buying trip and others such as minibus drivers who 
take advantage of their presence in the producing area to buy small quantities. 
These have little interest in promoting quality improvement.
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8BOX 8: ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF PROMOTING INCLUSIVE VALUE CHAINS●	 Examine all potential linkage models and do not automatically assume that producer organisations represent the best approach.
●	 Recognise that inclusive value chain models have to be flexible and 
should be adapted in the light of field experience.
●	 Identify ways of working with the strengths of rural traders as an 
alternative to involving producer organisations.
●	 Where farmers produce a range of products, consider chain 
upgrading strategies for more than one product.
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How important is  
finance to successful 
chain development?2
All of the case studies touched on the topic of finance as being both a constraint 
for inclusive value chain development and a problem also experienced by 
competing small-scale traders. Farmers often experience significant cash-flow 
problems. While their farming activities are, in themselves, profitable they do 
not generate cash at the right time in order to meet necessary costs. For 
example, labour costs, often underestimated, were reported as a constraint in 
Uganda, where application of cow dung on banana land cost around €80/ha. 
Advances to farmers were reported by all of the case studies, whether by the 
inclusive value chains studied, traditional traders, or both. However, both 
institutional lenders and value chain companies are often reluctant to lend 
where there is a high level of risk associated with an activity. The study of pig 
chains in Uganda found that no financial institution would lend to pig farmers 
because of the risk of swine fever.
A stumbling block during the PEPSICA project in Benin was the lack of access 
to credit by producers who, in order to meet household expenses such as 
school fees and labour, were obliged to sell part of the cashew crop early in 
the season when prices were low. To address this, the leading processor, with 
advice from the project, decided to make an advance payment to the farmer 
groups to enable them to buy from farmers in advance of the harvest, thus 
reducing their incentive to sell early to outside buyers. The project also linked 
cashew producers to a micro-finance institution through their producer group 
and cooperative. However, uptake of the loans was rather low, despite 
subsidised interest rates, with cashew producers using them mainly to hire 
labour for orchard maintenance activities. Advance payment was also reported 
by fish farmers in Uganda with buyers paying for fish from aquaculture two to 
three months in advance of the harvest. Some limited pre-financing was 
offered to farmers by one processor in the Burkina Faso jatropha sector. 
2 For a detailed review of this topic, see Miller and Jones, 2010.
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Membership of a group was a precondition to obtain such financing although 
repayment liability was at the individual, not group, level. However, this 
support to farmers became jeopardised by the lack of financing available to 
the processor; a problem that, in time, also meant that the processor was 
unable to buy all of the jatropha offered by farmers, who became frustrated 
and lost interest in producing.
In Senegal, the dairy company provided forage to producers, in particular to 
ensure feed availability during the dry season. The price was fixed in advance 
and producers were able to pay in cash or credit, with repayment deducted 
from payment due for their milk. The amount of feed allocated to each 
producer was theoretically controlled so that no producer could owe more 
than a set percentage of the expected monthly milk payment. However, this 
caused problems because the time that producers required the feed the most 
was the time when they made the smallest deliveries. Despite the dairy’s 
controls on credit advances there were occasions when producers found that 
they owed money at the end of the month. At the end of 2012, LdB was forced 
to forgive the debts of all producers because their debts had become 
unsustainable. Debt forgiveness of this type is not generally recommended by 
development finance professionals on the grounds that it creates the 
possibility of ‘moral hazard’. This means that the borrower fails to use a loan 
efficiently, confident that, whatever he or she does, the debt will eventually be 
forgiven. Under such circumstances it becomes difficult for a rural financial 
institution to develop a viable business model or for a contracting company to 
run a profitable contract farming operation. Thus, in the long run, politicians 
in some countries who dictate that debts should be forgiven may actually be 
harming rather than helping farmers, by reducing the availability of rural 
finance or contracting opportunities in the country.
In Madagascar, the French fair-trade buyer pre-funded 39% of the value of the 
contract, paying the remainder after three months. Pre-financing support was 
also supplied by a French ‘solidarity bank’, SIDI. The Fanohana cooperative 
was also able to negotiate some pre-financing from a local processor for the 
supply of fair-trade fruit for processing and export to France, and was able to 
use its confirmed export contracts to obtain trade receivables financing, 
whereby the lender could use the contract as collateral. The traditional 
marketing channels for litchi in Madagascar also involved significant pre-
financing by the larger traders. This suggests that the majority of farmers had 
little capital and, acting individually or even as groups, would not have been 
able to finance their own marketing activities, even if the marketing channels 
were equipped to buy from them. Given the lack of funds available to most 
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farmers, the capacity of farmer organisations and cooperatives to develop 
value chain activities without outside assistance would appear to be minimal. 
As noted earlier, jatropha farmers had experienced difficulties in paying their 
membership subscriptions.
BOX 9: WAYS OF IMPROVING CHAIN FINANCING
●	 Conduct detailed studies of the financial constraints facing farmers 
in order to understand the impact of these on the potential for 
inclusive value chain development, and the ways of addressing 
such constraints.
●	 Within a contract farming context, consider providing loans for 
inputs, as well as other advances. However, ensure that farmers do 
not reach a level of indebtedness that will jeopardise repayment.
●	 Require investors in inclusive value chains to demonstrate that 
their resources and cash flow are adequate to honour commitments 
to provide inputs and make timely payments for the products.
●	 Investigate the potential for warehouse receipt financing for non-
perishable products or for financing against confirmed orders.
●	 Wherever possible, work with local financial institutions, both to 
increase the flow of finance into the chain and to promote the 
availability of financial services in rural areas.
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Companies may lack both the capacity and the resources to develop inclusive 
value chains even if, in principle, they recognise the need to work more closely 
with small farmers. As noted earlier, depending on the crop, there is generally 
a preference to work with larger farmers as these offer economies of scale, 
both in terms of the quantities they produce and when delivering technical 
and other assistance.
While there are examples of companies working directly with many thousands 
of small farmers, either by choice or for want of an alternative, the general 
practice seems to be for smallholders in value chains to be organised into 
formal or informal groups. The majority of companies lack staff qualified to 
carry out the specialised and time-consuming work necessary to ensure 
effective group organisation, and lack the resources to employ such individuals. 
Similarly, while companies are increasingly employing their own extension 
staff, they usually lack both the facilities and the qualified trainers to carry 
out formal training of farmers.
Thus, the support that NGOs and development projects can offer enables 
companies to work with smaller farmers without having to develop a whole 
range of new skills. In Benin, for example, a cashew processor established a 1.5 
ha model farm and a Cashew Farmer School which were then used by the 
PEPSICA project to build the capacity of lead farmers that the project had 
identified after forming farmers into groups. The project also facilitated 
meetings between cashew producer organisations and the company, which 
built relationships between the two parties, and permitted the company to 
clarify quality and quantity requirements and arrangements for purchase.
A similar role was played by SNV in the oilseeds sector in Uganda. Prior to 
2009, the leading company, Mukwano, had worked individually with 45,000 
farmers but this proved unsustainable. With SNV support it developed a 
What role can technical 
assistance play?9
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cluster approach in which farmer groups were coordinated by lead farmers 
and connected to ‘site coordinators’ who were working on contract for the 
company and were supported by the company’s extension agents. Each group 
managed around 30 farmers and had access to hybrid seeds at cost, technical 
support and a guaranteed market and minimum price, with the opportunity to 
negotiate before harvest for prices above the guaranteed minimum.
In Madagascar, as described in Box 6 in Chapter 6, the NGO, AVSF, played a 
major role in developing market linkages with buyers in Europe. This seems to 
be an important technical assistance role because both cooperative managers 
and owners of small-scale export businesses are unlikely to have any 
experience of market research and development. Indeed, exports from ACP 
countries are often made to contacts in the diaspora – even though exporting 
in this way is quite risky – rather than to more established food importers. A 
further problem faced by ACP exporters to Europe is that even if they have 
the skills to identify and develop markets, they are finding it increasingly 
difficult to obtain visas for visits to explore those markets, a problem not 
faced by international staff of NGOs.
While donor and NGO support can have a very positive impact on value chain 
development, both in terms of the technical assistance provided and the 
funding made available, the question arises as to what happens when that 
support comes to an end. Often, the model followed by the development 
assistance cannot be maintained once that assistance is withdrawn. This is 
likely to be because of a lack of resources, both financial and human, to carry 
on activities that were previously being provided largely free of charge. 
Collaboration with development agencies makes sense for the private sector 
when it has few costs to bear, but subsequently taking on those costs itself 
may not represent a very good business model. In Uganda, for example, the 
oilseed processor that had worked with SNV did not independently take over 
the activities after SNV’s project ended.
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BOX 10: PROVIDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
●	 Enables companies to link with farmers they would otherwise be 
reluctant or ill-equipped to work with.
●	 Facilitates provision of training on topics, such as group formation, 
on which companies have no expertise.
●	 Can promote essential communication between farmers and buyer, 
without which inclusive value chains cannot work.
●	 Can enable companies and cooperatives to access new markets 
they may otherwise be unaware of and can promote trust between 
them and these markets.
●	 May give a false picture of the viability of the inclusive business 
model if buyers lack the resources and skills to continue 
implementation after the technical assistance has ended.
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Conclusions
The papers used for these case studies inevitably provide a slightly biased 
approach to the topic of value chain development for small farmers. This is 
because the organisations applying to CTA for funding to prepare such studies 
are likely to be the NGOs involved in supporting their development. Indeed, 
five of the case studies were prepared by NGOs and concerned activities in 
which those NGOs were, or in some cases still are, actively engaged. It is 
improbable that any of the chains described in this report, other than the 
banana, pig and fish chains in Uganda analysed by the Shoreline study, would 
have emerged in the form described without NGO or other intervention.
While the Fanohana cooperative in Madagascar benefitted from some earlier 
moves towards cooperative litchi trading by a few farmer leaders, the 
development of export markets for fresh and processed certified products, 
particularly fair trade, would not, according to the French fair-trade importer, 
have been possible without involvement of the NGO, AVSF. Fanohana was also 
able to obtain funding from a government project to pay for a salaried 
management team as well as for infrastructure investments. In West Africa, 
one reason for forming cooperatives in the jatropha sector was that official 
registration would qualify the cooperative for various subsidies from the 
government or NGOs. In Senegal, the dairy admitted that it could not have 
operated the programme of nutrition development out of its own resources 
and that the contribution of partners was essential for it to work. This suggests 
that the benefits of the programme in terms of increased milk deliveries may 
have been relatively small.
The use of full-time business management appears to be essential for 
cooperatives and farmer organisations seeking to become involved directly in 
value chains as there are many risks associated with a lack of management 
skills. However, there is often a chicken-and-egg situation in that embryonic 
business activities generate insufficient surplus to pay for such managers. 
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This would appear to provide a convincing case for external funding of 
management, as long as realistic projections indicate that the activities will 
eventually be able to cover such costs, and as long as the subsidies are not 
used solely to increase farmer incomes, thereby providing false perceptions 
of the value chain’s profitability. However, none of the case studies provide 
indications that such considerations were taken into account.
Studies of contract farming and similar arrangements have always stressed 
that extensive communication between the parties is essential in order to 
build up trust. While making considerable efforts to achieve this seems to 
have been an important factor in the success of the Fanohana litchi cooperative, 
other case studies, such as that on jatropha, identified problems in this area. 
Farmers need to be consulted from the outset, both about the wisdom of 
introducing a new product to an area and about the structure proposed for 
the value chain. The jatropha case study also concluded that where contracts 
were used for jatropha they were often extremely vague. Contracts do need to 
be kept simple, so that they can be easily understood, but they also need to 
clearly indicate the responsibilities of both the producers and the buyers and 
be fully explained to farmers.
In contrast to the frequent support provided by donors and NGOs to farmer 
organisations, it is rare to find projects and programmes that provide either 
technical assistance or direct support to traders. However, a case can be 
made, as suggested by the SNV study, that investments in the informal sector 
can achieve as much if not more than investments in producer organisations 
or even investments to support linkages with poorer farmers by large 
commercial concerns. Traders respond to smallholders’ needs and may 
contribute to their inclusion in value chains. Strengthening traders – for 
example by facilitating their access to finance from financial institutions, 
improving post-harvest handling and storage, introducing a capacity to advise 
farmers on production and on input use, and developing trader associations, 
together with efforts to improve transparency in the informal sector – could 
benefit producers by improving services to farmers who, for various reasons 
(see Chapter 4), are unable or unwilling to be incorporated in more sophisticated 
value chains. This could lead to greater inclusion of smaller, asset-poorer and 
more risk-averse farmers. However, few traders are, on their own, in a position 
to invest in production intensification and quality improvement.
With one exception, the studies used for this paper each looked at the 
development of an inclusive value chain for just one product, i.e. jatropha, 
litchi, sunflower, dairy, and cashew. However, some of the studies noted that 
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the products being promoted represented one of several or many products 
being produced by the farmers. One of the strengths of traditional traders is 
that they can handle a range of products. Particularly when these products 
are harvested at different times of the year, traders can maximise the use of 
their storage and transport by buying a range of products and can also use 
profits from the trading of one to buy another later in the year. Where inclusive 
value chains are promoted using producer organisations, such economies are 
not normally available to the organisation, particularly if the new chain is its 
first venture into trading activities. This makes it more difficult to compete 
with traders. Indeed, the Fanohana cooperative in Madagascar had recognised 
this and was beginning to work with its members on other crops in addition to 
litchi. In certain circumstances there may therefore be a case for donors to 
move away from concentration on one product at a time to more of a ‘whole 
farm’ approach to value chain development, where emphasis is placed on 
upgrading the skills of those working in a variety of product chains relevant to 
farmers in a particular area.
Projects and businesses seeking to promote inclusive value chains do need to 
carry out a realistic assessment of the capacity of smaller farmers to take on 
risk. Because a particular investment by a farmer seems like a good idea to 
the manager of a contracting company, or to an NGO staff member, it does not 
mean that the investment will be seen in the same light by poor farmers, 
particularly if it appears likely that such an investment will increase their risk. 
Similarly, other socio-economic implications must be considered from the 
beginning. Will farm families have the necessary labour resources when labour 
is required? If not, will there be people available to be recruited to carry out 
casual farm work, and will farmers have access to the cash to pay them? If 
not, could involvement in value chains lead to increased levels of child labour?
Consideration of gender implications is also vital. Will participation in inclusive 
value chains increase the workload of women? Will it result in less land for 
food production for their families? Will it have other nutritional implications, 
such as in the Senegal dairy case where households sold fresh milk for cash 
and purchased powdered milk for their own consumption? Will women share 
in the monetary benefits of value chain participation or will the payments all 
be taken by their husbands? If the answer to some of these questions is ‘yes’ 
or ‘perhaps’ then a re-examination of the approach is likely to be necessary.
Financing of agriculture is a complex issue. Creative approaches to providing 
value chain finance are now being developed. These aim to address the high 
level of risk usually experienced by lending institutions when making short or 
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medium-term loans to farmers or other value chain actors. Much remains to 
be done, however. It seems essential that value chain finance must be placed 
on a sound commercial footing from the start if it is to be sustainable. Those 
developing inclusive value chain projects therefore have a responsibility to 
avoid direct subsidies and work with financial institutions to develop sound 
financing arrangements based on commercial principles. Unsustainable 
interventions not only jeopardise the project they are applied to but also put 
at risk the entire rural financial structure, as those not benefitting from 
subsidies seek similar arrangements to those who are.
Government agencies and NGOs can only intervene in a limited way to promote 
inclusive value chains. Thus the prevailing concern is how to replicate 
apparently successful large-scale interventions and how to scale-up activities 
that have been successful on a small scale or as a pilot. As noted at the end of 
Chapter 9, private businesses may not always wish to carry on donor-led 
activities once a project has ended. This suggests that new project activities 
need to be planned in close collaboration with companies and with a strong 
emphasis on developing affordable interventions that, if successful, will 
provide a business case for the private-sector partner to continue implementing 
them. In turn, demonstrated profitability should provide the model for future 
replication or scaling up.
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